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JOB SECURITY FOR THE AT WILL EMPLOYEE:
CONTRACTUAL RIGHT OF DISCHARGE
FOR CAUSE
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan
408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980)
The right to earn a living is one of the most valuable rights en-
joyed by citizens in a free society. Nonetheless, for more than a century
the American rule of employment has been that, absent an explicit con-
tract to the contrary, an employment relationship of indefinite duration
is terminable at the will of either the employee or the employer.' The
employee may quit at any time without notice or reason and the em-
ployer may lawfully discharge the employee "for good cause, for no
cause, or even for cause morally wrong."' 2 In contrast, an employment
contract of definite duration may be terminated only if there is suffi-
cient cause. 3 However, an employer's right to discharge, where the
term of employment is indefinite, is not absolute. An employee may be
shielded from unjust discharge by the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement 4 or by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19645 where a
1. See 3A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 684 (1963); WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1017 (3rd ed.
1957). Under this view of terminability, such an agreement is not a contract at all but "an expres-
sion in which the promises are illusory, since refusal to perform is not a breach, being merely an
exercise of a reserved power to terminate." I CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 96 (1963). Nonetheless,
most cases in which the rule is cited refer to the employment relationship as one of "contract,"
irrespective of whether that "contract" was held to be enforceable.
2. Payne v. Western & A.R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 520-21 (1884), overruled on other grounds sub
nom., Hutton v. Watters, 132 Tenn. 527, 179 S.W. 134 (1915); See 53 AM. JUR. 2d Master and
Servant § 43, at 117-18 (1970), where it is said that "[w]hen the employment is not for a definite
term and there is no contractual or statutory restriction upon the right of discharge, an employer
may lawfully discharge an employee whenever and for whatever cause he chooses, without liabil-
ity."
Although the at will employee has no protection from arbitrary discharge, he is protected
from third party interference with his employment contract. See, e.g., Porcelli v. Joseph Schlitz
Brewing Co., 397 F. Supp. 889 (E.D. Wis. 1975); Hill Grocery Co. v. Carroll, 136 So. 789 (Ala.
1931) (cases where employees recovered for tortious interference with employment leading to their
discharges).
3. The maxim generally followed where the term of employment is stated is that the em-
ployment may not be cancelled without a "cause sufficient in law which would justify an employer
in discharging an employee." Vogel v. Pathe Exch., Inc., 234 App. Div. 313, 318, 254 N.Y.S. 881,
886 (2d Dep't 1932); see also Ward v. Consol. Foods Corp., 480 S.W.2d 483 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972);
Blumrosen, Employer Discipline: United States Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 428, 435-37 (1964).
4. The right to bargain collectively is secured in § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974) [hereinafter referred to as the NLRAJ. Seventy-nine
percent of the collective bargaining agreements surveyed provided that employees could not be
discharged without "cause" or "just cause." [19791 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, NEGOTIATIONS &
CONTRACTS (BNA) 40:1. Where dismissal for just cause only is not provided for by agreement,
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discharge is racially or sexually discriminatory or by statute or judicial
decision 6 where a discharge is contrary to public policy. Nonetheless,
most 7 American workers remain subject to the risk of arbitrary or mali-
cious discharge.8 A recent Michigan Supreme Court decision, Tous-
saint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan ,9 may afford increased
job protection to a significant number of Michigan's at will workers
whose discharges are not otherwise protected by statute or judicial de-
cision.
The issue in Toussaint'0 was whether an employer's promise to
discharge an employee only for good cause was legally enforceable if
the promise was made orally at the hiring I or was expressed as a com-
arbitrators invariably read such a term into the agreement. Summers, Individual Protections
Against Unjust Dismissal.- Timefor a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481, 499-500 (1976) [hereinafter
referred to as Summers].
5. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-15 (1976)
[hereinafter referred to as Title VII].
6. Examples of discharges which have been held to be contrary to public policy are:
Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (refusing
to commit perjury); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979) (filing work-
men's compensation claim); Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975) (reporting for jury
duty); Harless v. First Nat'l, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978) (attempting to force employer to com-
ply with state and federal consumer credit and protection laws). But see Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire
Hosp., 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977), and Scroghan v. Kraftco Corp., 551 S.W.2d 811 (Ky. App.
1977) (where courts refused to recognize a public policy exception to the at will rule absent legisla-
tion); Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974), and Campbell v. Ford
Indust., Inc., 266 Or. 479, 513 P.2d 1153 (1973) (courts claimed to recognize the exception but
refused to allow it unless the violation of public policy was substantial).
7. There is no accurate accounting of the number of American workers without express
contracts of definite duration. The population at risk of arbitrary discharge is estimated to be
between 60-65% of the non-agricultural workforce. Peck, Unjust Discharges from Employment.- 4
Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 8-9 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as Peck]. The
percentage of workers subject to summary discharge is derived from the following statistics:
96,900,000 persons were employed in the United States in 1976. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BU-
REAU OF CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 1977, at 387, Table 625 (98th
ed. 1977). Of that number, approximately 80,000,000 are non-agricultural workers. Id. at 400,
Table 654; 28% of non-agricultural workers are protected by collective bargaining agreements.
U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, DEP'T OF LABOR, BULL. No. 1425-1, MAJOR COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING AGREEMENTS: GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE (1965). 79% of collective bargaining agree-
ments provided protection from discharge without cause. See note 4 supra. Approximately 2/2
million federal civil employees and 6 million state and local government employees have some
type of civil service protection.
8. In contrast, the laws in France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Sweden and the United Kingdom
provide workers with varying degrees of protection from arbitrary, unwarranted or poor cause
discharge. See, e.g., Peck, supra note 7, at 10-13; Summers, supra note 4, at 508-19.
9. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).
10. Two cases, Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 79 Mich. App. 429, 262
N.W.2d 848 (1978), and Ebling v. Masco Corp., 79 Mich. App. 531, 261 N.W.2d 74 (1977), were
consolidated for appeal.
11. Walter Ebling and Charles Toussaint claimed that they were promised they would not be
discharged except for cause on the occasion of their respective hirings. 408 Mich. at 597 n.5, 292
N.W.2d at 884 n.5.
NOTES AND COMMENTS
pany policy in its personnel manual.' 2 The Michigan Supreme Court
held that such a promise could become part of the employment con-
tract even though there had been no mutual intention to create contrac-
tual rights in the employee' 3 and even though the employee did not
learn of the policy until after the employment had commenced.
14
This comment will review the history and recent erosion of the
employment at will doctrine and discuss the limits of legislatively and
judicially secured job protection prior to Toussaint. Next, good cause
as a standard for termination will be discussed. Then, the comment
will present and analyze the opinion in Toussaint, focusing on the
court's contention that it was forging no new path but was merely clari-
fying the law which had long been misinterpreted. 15 Finally, this com-
ment will consider the possible legal and logistical effects of Toussaint
on the future of job protection for at will employees.
HISTORY OF THE AT WILL DOCTRINE
A number of early American cases 16 followed the English rule
that, unless otherwise specified, a hiring was presumed to be for one
year. 17 But in 1877, H.G. Wood announced the American rule in his
treatise on master-servant relationships:'
8
With us the rule is inflexible, that a general or indefinite hiring is
primafade a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a
yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish it by proof... but
unless their understanding was mutual that the service was to extend
for a certain fixed and definite period, it is an indefinite hiring and is
determinable at the will of either party .... 19
Although Wood neither justified this rule nor correctly interpreted the
12. Toussaint claimed that representations made in his employer's personnel manual formed
a part of his employment contract. Id.
13. Id. at 613-15, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 600, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
16. See, e.g., Adams v. Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 124, 26 N.E. 143 (1891); Davis v. Gorton, 16
N.Y. 255 (1857); Bascom v. Shillito, 37 Ohio St. 431 (1882).
17. The English common law rule evolved from the Statute of Labourers which provided
that apprentices could be discharged only "on reasonable cause." I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMEN-
TARIES 426 (1879). Laborers who did not reside with the master or who were hired by the day or
week were not similarly protected. Id. at 426-27. Beginning in the 19th century, the English rule
was that "unless otherwise specifically agreed, employment could be terminated only after a notice
period fixed by the custom of the trade, or a reasonable time if there were no custom, unless there
was cause for a summary dismissal." Peck, supra note 7, at 11. In 1971 employees in the United
Kingdom won statutory protection against unfair dismissal unless based upon an employee's ca-
pability, qualification, conduct, redundancy or other substantial reason. Industrial Relations Act,
1971, §§ 22, 24, 41 Hal. Stat. §§ 2062, 2088, 2090, 2091 (1971 Cont. Vol.).
18. H. WooD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 136 (2d ed. 1886).
19. 1d. at 283 n.5.
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four American cases that he cited, 20 the doctrine was accepted quickly,
often without question.
2'
One reason for the swift adoption of the terminable at will rule
was that it purportedly enhanced America's economic and industrial
development.22 Moreover, against the reigning philosophy of laissez
faire, the rule was considered equitable: The employer's right to con-
trol his workforce by retaining discharge discretion was balanced
against the worker's right to terminate the employment arrangement if
employment conditions became unfavorable to him.
23
As the rule evolved, numerous contracts for permanent employ-
20. The cases cited by Wood are Wilder v. United States (Wilder's Case), 5 Ct. Cl. 462
(1869), rev'don other grounds, 80 U.S. 254 (1871); DeBriar v. Minturn, I Cal. 450 (1851); Tatter-
son v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56 (1870); Franklin Mining Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115 (1871).
The Tatterson and Franklin cases contradict Wood's rule and evidence recoveries by employ-
ees for wrongful discharge, despite indefinite term employment contracts. In Tatterson, the plain-
tiff continued to work after a contract of definite term had expired and the jury found that a
contract of similar term could be implied. In Franklin, four months pay was awarded to a mining
captain who had been promised stable employment but was fired after eight months. The jury
found evidence sufficient to indicate a one year hiring.
Although an employer and his former employee were adverse parties in DeBriar, the cause of
action was for wrongful eviction and not for improper discharge. The DeBriar court held that the
employer could evict a former employee from the employer's lodging after the employment con-
tract expired so long as no force was used. Finally, Wilder's Case is not even tangentially related
to discharge issues because it involved a dispute over a commercial contract. In Wilder, a private
merchant contracted to transport goods to the United States Army. When the contract was ended,
the merchant, aware that the quartermaster could find no other delivery source, insisted on an
increased transporting fee. The Court of Claims held that the Army's silence in response to the
proposed increase constituted acceptance of the new term. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the statute of limitations on the claim had run.
21. Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895), is credited as being
the first case in which Wood's rule is cited. Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26
STANFORD L. REV. 335, 341-42 (1974) [hereinafter referred to as Stanford]; Harrod v. Wineman,
146 Iowa 718, 718, 125 N.W. 812, 813 (1910), where the court adopted the rule and indicated that
it relied for its authority on cases too numerous to mention.
22. Blackburn, Restricted Employer Discharge Rights. A Changing Concept ofEmployment at
Will, 17 AM. Bus. L.J. 467, 468-69 (1980) [hereinafter referred to as Blackburn]; Blades, Employ-
ment at Will vs. Individual Freedom On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67
COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967) [hereinafter referred to as Blades].
23. The United States Supreme Court elevated an employer's privilege of discharge to an
absolute constitutional right. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908). In Adair, a statute
prohibiting the discharge of a railroad employee because of his union membership was declared
unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that the freedom of contract allowed an employer to dis-
pense with the services of an employee for union membership, just as the employee was at liberty
to quit the employ of an employer who would not hire union men. Such refusal of business
relations might rest upon "reason, or [as] the result of whim, caprice, prejudice or malice." Id. at
173. The Court held that legislation to the contrary was an arbitrary interference with the free-
dom of contract as well as a violation of the fifth amendment's guarantee of the right not to be
deprived of property without due process. Id. at 175-76. Accord, Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. I
(1914).
The employer's privilege of discharge, however, has long since been discredited as a constitu-
tional right. See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), where the NLRA was
upheld. Accord, Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941), where the Court noted
that the course of its decisions since Adair had completely sapped that case of its authority.
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ment were held to be indefinite in term and, therefore, were considered
terminable at will.24 The courts' rationalization of how "permanent"
employment could be so tenuous was the explanation that the term
"permanent" described the type of work offered rather than its dura-
tion. 25 Permanent or lifetime employment thus was distinguished from
temporary or transient work which could be for a specific but short
term. For example, in Arentz v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co. ,26 the
New York Court of Appeals said that permanent employment could
imply nothing but indefinite term employment. The Arentz court re-
fused to believe that an employer would bind himself for a lifetime to a
worker whom he had not known prior to the hiring.
27
Despite the finding that "permanent" employment was not to con-
tinue forever, early cases that followed Wood's rule did not contem-
plate that a discharge could be made summarily or without cause. 28
The leading cases standing for this enlarged rule are Perry v. Wheeler
29
and Lord v. Goldberg.30 In Perry, a minister was promised permanent
employment and the lifetime use of the rectory. When the purpose of
the contract was thwarted because of serious disagreements between
the minister and his congregation, the congregation sought to remove
the minister from his pulpit. 3' The Perry court held that permanent
employment meant employment only until one or another of the con-
tracting parties had reason to end the relationship. The court further
held that dissolution of the pastoral relationship was proper only if the
dissatisfied party gave reasonable notice to the minister and only "upon
fair and equitable terms."
'32
In Lord, the employee had a written contract for permanent em-
ployment as a solicitor for a grocery store, but only for so long as the
employee used his best efforts on behalf of the proprietor. Apparently,
24. See, e.g., Alabama Mills v. Smith, Inc., 237 Ala. 296, 186 So. 699 (1939); Perry v.
Wheeler, 75 Ky. 541 (1876); Carnig v. Carr, 167 Mass. 544, 46 N.E. 117 (1877); Roxanna Petro-
leum Co. v. Rice, 107 Okla. 161, 235 P. 502 (1924); Forer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 36 Wis. 2d.
388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967); see generally 53 AM. JUR. 2d., Master and Servant § 32 (1970); An-
not., 60 A.L.R.3d. 226 (1974).
25. 53 AM. JUR. 2d, Master and Servant § 32 (1970); Annot. 60 A.L.R.3d 226 (1974).
26. 249 N.Y. 436, 164 N.E. 342 (1928).
27. Id. at 442, 164 N.E. at 343.
28. See, e.g., Perry v. Wheeler, 75 Ky. 541 (1877); Lord v. Goldberg, 81 Cal. 596, 22 P. 1126
(1889).
29. 75 Ky. 541 (1877).
30. 81 Cal. 596, 22 P. 1126 (1889).
31. The rift between the minister and his congregation was considerable. Despite the recom-
mendation for dissolution of the relationship by an ecclesiastical review board, the minister stub-
bornly clung to the rectory and refused to be ousted. 75 Ky. at 547.
32. Id. at 549.
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the employee had misrepresented his qualifications and could not per-
form as expected. Relying on Perry, the Lord court held that the em-
ployment was indefinite and, therefore, severable, but only "for some
good reason. ' 33 The court found that misrepresentation of one's capa-
bilities was good cause for dismissal.
The merger of Wood's rule that an indefinite hiring is terminable
at will 3 4 with the Lord and Perry corollary that a firing must be effected
only for good cause was short-lived. Subsequent courts dismissed the
requirement that good cause be a condition precedent to the firing of a
permanent employee and, in effect, ignored the reasonable expectations
of a generation of employees. 35 By the early twentieth century, the
prevalent formula was: "permanent employment equals indefinite em-
ployment equals employment at will."
36
Despite its broad acceptance, the "inflexible" terminable at will
rule has not always been followed mechanically. For example, a few
courts have considered the contractual stipulation of an employee's
compensation to be indicative of the duration of the hiring. In such
cases, the courts often find that the stipulation of pay in terms of a
stated weekly, monthly, annual or other time period constitutes some
basis for an inference that the employment is for a definite term which
is equal in length to the same time period for which an employee is
paid.
37
A second approach used by courts is to analyze the circumstances
surrounding the employment to ascertain the true intentions of the par-
ties.38 The usual rule applied is that unless the intentions are so vague
as to be indecipherable, an indefinite term contract will not be pre-
33. 81 Cal. at 602, 22 P. at 1128.
34. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
35. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Detroit, Y. & A.A. Ry., 135 Mich. 661, 98 N.W. 956 (1904).
36. See Stanford, supra note 21, at 345.
37. See, e.g., Sandt v. Mason, 208 Ga. 561, 67 S.E.2d 767 (1951) (weekly pay indicates defi-
nite employment for one week); Putnam v. Producers' Livestock Marketing Ass'n, 256 Ky. 196, 75
S.W.2d 1075 (1934) (annual salary indicates a one year contract); Alkire v. Alkire Orchard Co., 79
W.Va. 526, 91 S.E. 384 (1917) (employment for a stipulated monthly salary is employment for one
month's time); Lowenstein v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, 319 F. Supp. 1096 (D.C.
Mass. 1970) (applying Massachusetts law) (annual pay is some evidence supporting finding of
definite term employment); but cf. Atwood v. Cutiss Candy Co., 22 I11. App. 2d 369, 161 N.E.2d
355 (1959), and Justice v. Stanley Aviation Corp., 35 Colo. App. 1, 530 P.2d 984 (1974) (cases
where the period for which compensation is to be earned does not, standing alone, create a pre-
sumption that the parties intended the hiring to be for other than an indefinite period).
38. Littel v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 120 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1941), is the leading case.
The court said that even absent special consideration, where the parties clearly intend to make a
contract for permanent employment, such a contract is enforceable and not terminable at will.
See text accompanying notes 44-49 infra. See also Drzewiecki v. H.&R. Block, Inc., 24 Cal. App.
3d 695, 101 Cal. Rptr. 169 (1972); McCall Co. v. Wright, 133 App. Div. 62, 68, 117 N.Y.S. 775, 779
(1909) (although a specific term was not expressed by precise words, the surrounding circum-
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sumed to be at will. 39
Those courts which look to the intentions of the parties describe
two exceptions to the at will rule. One exception states that contracts
for permanent employment are at will unless the employment contract
is marked by distinguishing features, provisions or consideration over
and above the services to be rendered.40  For example, an employee's
longevity of service4' or an employer's promises capable of inducing
reasonable reliance of job security42 have been found to distinguish in-
stances determined that the whole contract was "instinct with . . . obligation"); see also 3A
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 684 (1963).
39. Heyman Cohen & Sons, Inc. v. M. Lurie Woolen Co., Inc., 232 N.Y. 112, 133 N.E. 370
(1921); Wiener v. Pictorial Paper Packaging Corp., 303 Mass. 123, 20 N.E. 458 (1897). But cf.
Stevenson v. ITT Harper, Inc., 51 111. App. 3d 568, 366 N.E.2d 561 (1977) (where there is no
ambiguity, a court will not add covenants to a contract simply to reach a more equitable result).
40. See, e.g., Foley v. Community Oil Co., 64 F.R.D. 561 (D.C.N.H. 1974), and Prussing v.
General Motors Corp., 403 Mich. 366, 269 N.W.2d 181 (1978) (cases where the longevity of an
employee's service distinguished a contract otherwise terminable at will); Chinn v. China Nat'l
Aviation Corp., 138 Cal. App. 2d 98, 291 P.2d 91 (1955) (after employer induced employee not to
resign by offering fringe benefits, arbitrary discharge was improper); Wiener v. Pictorial Paper
Package Corp., 303 Mass. 123, 20 N.E.2d 458 (1939) (where employee took charge of stock, re-
ceived a stipulated percentage of sales and after six months was to draw his own contract, arbi-
trary discharge was improper); Werner v. Biederman, 64 Ohio App. 423, 28 N.E.2d 957 (1940)
(contract to employ an attorney for a very special task so long as employer is in business is en-
forceable); But cf. Buyan v. J.L. Jacobs & Co., 428 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1970) (applying Illinois law)
(where employee was fired one month after arriving in Saudi Arabia to begin a job which, accord-
ing to employer's tax records, was for 18 months, no features were found to distinguish the con-
tract from an otherwise at will relationship); Odom v. Bush, 125 Ga. 184, 53 S.E. 1013 (1906)
(where plaintiff resigned his position of 25 years, sold his home and stock in the company and
moved to a new town to help another begin a business, contributed part of his salary and the
profits from the sale of his house and stock to start-up capital for the new venture and was fired
when the venture prospered, the court found no evidence of other than an at will contract); Lynas
v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 273 N.W. 315 (1937) (resigning a current job and selling a
house are merely activities to enable an employee to accept new employment).
41. See, e.g., Foley v. Community Oil Co., 64 F.R.D. 561 (D.C.N.H. 1974); Prussing v. Gen-
eral Motors Corp., 403 Mich. 366, 269 N.W.2d 181 (1978). But see Hernden v. Consumers Power
Co., 72 Mich. App. 349, 249 N.W.2d 419 (1976) (despite 28 years of service, indefinite term em-
ployment is at will and an employee may be fired for an arbitrary reason).
42. See, e.g., Hardin v. Eska Co., 256 Iowa 371, 127 N.W.2d 595 (1964) (discharge was im-
proper where plaintiff incurred costs by promoting employer's product and hiring new salesman
subsequent to employer's promise of an exclusive sales territory); accord, Feinberg. v. Pfeiffer Co.,
322 S.W.2d 163 (Mo. 1959). The theory upon which recovery is based in cases of detrimental
reliance is promissory estoppel. The widely accepted statement of the theory is found in § 90 of
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (Tentative Draft No. 7 1972):
A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance
on the part of the promisee of a third person and which does induce such action or
forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise.
In its classic form, promissory estoppel is a device for validating promises separate from consider-
ation. According to the Restatement, the doctrine is not formulated either as a species of consider-
ation or as an element in the bargain-type of contract. Rather, promissory estoppel is applicable
where the bargained for element of consideration is missing but a promise has induced detrimen-
tal reliance. J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 92, at 201 (2d ed. 1974). An example is the
gratuitous promise. Increasingly, however, courts are treating the unbargained for reliance as a
species of consideration and hold that an informal contract is formed. See, e.g., Porter v. Coin-
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definite term employment contracts otherwise terminable at will.
The second exception allows the harshness of the at will rule to be
avoided only where the employee pays consideration in addition to his
services. 43 The rationale underlying the extra consideration exception
is that the employee is said to have purchased his employment by con-
ferring a benefit upon his employer greater than the value of his serv-
ices and thereby has suffered a detriment. 44 An example is where an
employee gives up the right to sue his employer for a work-related in-
jury in exchange for the employer's promise of lifetime employment.
45
The courts which recognize the payment of extra consideration as
the only exception to the at will rule generally hold that without extra
consideration the employment contract must fail for lack of mutual-
ity.46 The doctrine of mutuality of obligation requires that each party
to a contract be bound or neither is bound. 47 The doctrine typically
applies to bilateral contracts48 where each party makes one or more
missioner, 60 F.2d 673, 675 (2d. Cir. 1932); Miller v. Lawlor, 245 Iowa 1144, 1152, 66 N.W.2d 267,
272 (1954). See also Note. Protection ofAesthetic Interest, 41 IOWA L. REV. 296, 300 (1956).
43. See, e.g., Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Zell, 250 Ala. 146, 33 So. 2d 255 (1947); Gerald B.
Lambert Co. v. Flemming, 169 Ark. 532, 275 S.W. 912 (1925); Lord v. Goldberg, 81 Cal. 596,22 P.
1126 (1889); Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 226, §§ 4-6 (1974) and the cases collected therein.
44. See, e.g., Alabama Mills, Inc. v. Smith, 237 Ala. 296, 186 So. 699 (1939) (employee relin-
quished claim against employer for work-related injury in exchange for promise of lifetime em-
ployment); Stauter v. Walnut Grove Prods., 188 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1971) (plaintiffs were induced
to sell their businesses to defendant as an incident to employment). But some cases have denied
recovery because no economic or financial benefit accrued to the employer despite a detriment to
the employee. See, e.g., Rape v. Mobile & 0. R.R., 136 Miss. 38, 100 So. 585 (1924) (substantial
moving expenses incurred by employee do not benefit the employer); Forer v. Sears, Roebuck &
Co., 36 Wis. 2d 388, 153 N.W.2d 587 (1967) (an employee who had resigned for ill health and was
induced to sell his farm and livestock at a loss to return to manage his former employer's concern
cannot claim a benefit to the employer).
45. See, e.g., F.S. Royster Guano Co. v. Hall, 68 F.2d 533 (4th Cir. 1934) (applying North
Carolina law); Alabama Mills, Inc. v. Smith, 237 Ala. 296, 186 So. 699 (1939); Fisher v. John L.
Roper Lumber Co., 183 N.C. 485, I11 S.E. 857 (1922).
46. See, e.g., Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975), a case factu-
ally similar to Toussaint in that the employee claimed that he was discharged in violation of terms
expressed in his employer's handbook. In Shaw, the appellate court said that:
Even assuming, arguendo, that the handbook. . . [was] part of the contract, in the ab-
sence of a promise on the part of the employer that the employment should continue...
for a period of time that is either definite or capable of determining, the employment
relationship. . . is terminable at the will of the employer. . . There being no bindingr romise on the part of the employee that he would continue in the employment ...
the employment] is terminable at his discretion as well. For want of mutuality of obli-
gation or consideration, such a contract would be unenforceable ...
Id. at 779. See also Annot., 60 A.L.R.3d 226 (pt. 11 1974) and the cases collected therein.
47. See, e.g., Storm v. United States, 94 U.S. 76 (1876); Clarke v. Atlantic Stevedoring Co.,
163 F. 423 (2d Cir. 1908) (applying New York law); Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 273
N.W. 315 (1937).
48. See, e.g., Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520, 117 N.W.2d 213 (1962). When
the act is wholly or partially performed "[s]uch performance ordinarily indicates acceptance as
well as furnishing the consideration." Id. at 531-32, 117 N.W.2d at 221. See also Chinn v. China
704
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promises to the other. An employment contract, however, is generally
unilateral because the employer is seeking only an act or performance
rather than a return promise. Consequently, in those jurisdictions re-
quiring mutuality of obligation to support a contract, the employment
contract is generally held to be unenforceable because the employee
has not made a return promise or suffered a detriment in return for the
employer's promise of permanent employment or his promise not to
discharge except for cause. Where extra consideration is paid by the
employee, however, some courts will enforce the employer's promise
because the employee has suffered a detriment similar to the detriment
suffered by the employee who makes a return promise in a bilateral
contract.
The modern view, however, is that consideration and not mutual-
ity of obligation is necessary to support a contract.49 Section 75 of the
Second Restatement of Contracts defines consideration as either a bar-
gained for performance or a return promise.50 Therefore, both the uni-
Nat'l Aviation Corp., 131 Cal. App. 2d 98, 291 P.2d 91 (1955); Delaware Trust Co. v. Delaware
Trust Co., 43 Del. Ch. 186, 222 A.2d 320 (1966); IA CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 152, at 3 (1963).
49. See, e.g., Ryan v. Upchurch, 474 F. Supp. 211, 217 (S.D. Ind. 1979); Toussaint v. Blue
Cross, 408 Mich. 579, 600, 292 N.W.2d 880, 885 (1980); Stauter v. Walnut Grove Prods, 188
N.W.2d 305, 311 (Iowa 1971); Standard Oil Co. v. Veland, 207 Iowa 1340, 1343, 224 N.W. 467,
469 (1929); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 81, at 64 (Tentative Draft No. 7 1972); IA
CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 152, at 2-6 (1963); I WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 105A, at 422 (1957);
Williston, Consideration in Bilateral Contracts, 27 HARV. L. REV. 503, 525 (1914). See also [1980]
LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (1 State Laws) $ 47,000 (state laws abolishing the requirement of mutuality of
contract).
Despite some courts' steadfast insistence on mutuality of obligation as a requirement to en-
forceability of the indefinite term employment contract, courts in other contexts uniformly hold
otherwise. For example, "a promise that is voidable because of infancy, or insanity, or because of
fraud, duress, or illegality, can be, nevertheless, consideration to make a counter-promise binding
and enforceable." J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 90, at 192 (2d ed. 1974).
Where mutuality of obligation has been abolished, there is imposed on the employee the duty
to perform his services in a skillful and workmanlike manner. Failure to perform services accord-
ingly may be cause for discharge, where cause is required. See, e.g., Ingram v. Dallas County
Water Control and Improvement Dist., 425 S.W.2d 366 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968). See also Nash v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 383 Mich. 136,174 N.W.2d 818 (1970) (employer may be entitled to dam-
ages as a result of unworkmanlike performance by employee); 9 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS
§ 1012C (3d ed. 1967).
50. Section 75 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS (Tentative Draft No. 7 1972)
sets forth that:
(1) To constitute consideration, a performance or a return promise must be bargained
for.
(2) A performance of return promise is bargained for if it is sought by the promisor in
exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.
(3) The performance may consist of
(a) an act other than a promise, or
(b) a forbearance, or
(c) the creation, modification or destruction of a legal relationship.
The phrase "bargained for" is explained in Comment b:
[lIt is enough that one party manifests an intention to induce the other's response and to
be induced by it and that the other responds in accordance with the inducement. But it is
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lateral contract where a performance such as work is sought and the
bilateral contract where mutual promises are exchanged are enforcea-
ble. Mutuality of obligation is but one indication of valid considera-
tion. Where any other consideration is found, mutuality of obligation
is unnecessary. 5'
Moreover, the law of contracts does not prohibit a promisor from
obligating himself to do two or more things while exacting in return
only a single promise or performance. 52 Accordingly, an employer
could promise to pay wages and not to discharge an employee without
cause as well as to confer a number of other benefits on the indefinite
term employee in exchange for the employee's services. Once the em-
ployee has partially performed in accordance with the employee's spec-
ifications, the employer is bound to retain the employee unless there is
good cause to discharge him. At least with respect to employment con-
tracts', however, this view of contracts is seldom acknowledged because
many courts steadfastly cling to the notion that mutuality of obligation
is needed in order to enforce a contract.
EROSION OF THE TERMINABLE AT WILL RULE
Early in the twentieth century the economy was stable and Ameri-
can business was transformed from the small shop into the giant indus-
trial complex. The power of the employer over the at will employee
became awesome.53 An employee had scant chance of winning in-
creased wages or working conditions in the large, impersonal setting.
Theoretically, an at will worker was still free to quit when he chose.
Realistically, however, he knew that jobs in the cities were scarce and
that thousands of unskilled and undemanding immigrant workers
waited anxiously to replace him. Thus, it was only the employer who
was sheltered by the terminable at will rule.
54
The widespread insecurity of industrial workers largely fueled the
not enough that the promise induces the conduct of the promisee or that the conduct of
the promisee induces the making of the promise; both elements must be present or there
is no bargain.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 75 (Tentative Draft No. 7 1972).
51. IA CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 152, at 6 n.5 (1963).
52. 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 125, at 535 (1963); J. CALMARI & J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS
§ 75, at 146 (1970).
53. See Blades, supra note 22; Blackburn, supra note 22.
54. No doubt the employer sometimes is a "loser" under the at will rule. For example, where
an employee was trained in a specialized or developing technology, the employee, free by the at
will rule to sell his skills at a premium in a scarce market, can leave his employer without an
equivalently trained replacement.
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union movement and swelled its ranks.5" Organized labor's power was
recognized with the passage of the NLRA 56 in 1935. Although the
NLRA does not provide that an employee shall be discharged only for
cause, the majority of the unionized workforce subsequently became
protected from unjust discharge by the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement.5 7 Other employees are now protected by federal law from
discharge due to their race, color, religion, sex or national origin58 or
age. 59 An employee is also protected from arbitrary dismissal if he is a
returning veteran,60 or civil servant6' or if his wages have been gar-
nished for any one indebtedness. 62 A number of states have enacted
similar statutes.
63
Thus, statutory protection from arbitrary or unjust discharge ex-
ists, but only for select workers. Between sixty and sixty-five percent of
the nonagricultural workforce is still subject to the risk of unjust dis-
missal.64 This schism between protected and unprotected workers has
55. See generall, A. BLUM, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN LABOR MOVEMENT (1972); G.
HILDEBRAND, AMERICAN UNIONISM: AN HISTORICAL AND ANALYTICAL SURVEY (1979).
56. National Labor Relations Act of 1935, Act of July 5, 1935, Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat.
449 (codfiedat 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974)).
57. Sections 8(a)(I) and 8(a)(3) respectively prohibit the discharge of employees for exercise
of their right to organize and bargain collectively and discrimination in employment due to union
membership or discouraging union membership. See [1980] LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (I State Laws)
47,000 (statutory texts of comparable state laws). The right to bargain collectively is secured in § 7
of the NLRA. Seventy-nine percent of the collective bargaining agreements surveyed provided
that employees could not be discharged without just cause. [19791 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING:
NEGOTIATIONS & CONTRACTS (BNA) 40: 1. Where dismissal for just cause is not provided for by
agreement, arbitrators invariably read a good cause term into the agreement. See Summers, supra
note 4, at 499-500.
Federal law does prohibit the discharge of public employees covered by civil service law or
regulation except "for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the service." 5 U.S.C.,
§ 7501(a) (1976). State and local employees have varying degrees of job protection. See, e.g., J.
WEISBERGER, JOB SECURITY AND PUBLIC EMPLOYEES (1973); Comment, Patronage Dismissals.-
Constitutional Limits and Political Justifications, 41 U. CHI. L. REV. 297 (1974).
58. Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-15 (1976), prohibits employment discrimina-
tion on the basis of race, creed, nationality and sex. Title VII also has been held to prohibit
discharges due to height, weight and marital status. See, e.g., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 430 U.S. 321
(1977) (height and weight are improper standards for excluding applicants for positions as prison
guards); Sprogis v. United Airlines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971)
(marital status); cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973) (where plaintiff
meets the prima facie burden of proving racial discrimination, employer may overcome by show-
ing legitimate reasons for the discharge and that such reasons are not mere pretext).
59. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 631-34 (1976).
60. Vietnam Era Veteran's Readjustment Assistance Act of 1974, 38 U.S.C. § 2012(A) (Supp.
IV 1974).
61. Civil Service Reform Act of 1969, 5 U.S.C. § 7501 (Supp. 11 1978).
62. Consumer Credit Protection Act of 1969, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1976).
63. See, e.g., Michigan Fair Employment Practices Act, Mich. Comp. Laws §§ 423-310
(1978); Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. §§ 951-954 (1964).
64. See note 7 supra.
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led to a number of scholarly articles advocating change. 65 Professor
Lawrence Blades spearheaded the reform movement, calling upon the
courts to recognize a new tort: abusive discharge. 66 Blades argued that
contract law, primarily because of the confusion over consideration and
mutuality concepts,67 provides little relief from unjust dismissal. Tort
law, he felt, was "a more elastic principle," pervaded by emphasis on
wrongful or ulterior motive.
68
A number of courts responded to Blades' challenge by recognizing
the tort of abusive or retaliatory discharge. The tort, however, has been
limited to situations where the dismissal contravenes public policy.
69
Using this tort concept, courts have found that at will employees have
been wrongfully discharged when the basis for the discharge has been
for serving on juries,70 for refusing to commit perjury, 71 for filing work-
men's compensation claims, 72 or for "whistle-blowing" on fellow em-
65. See, e.g., Blackburn, supra note 22; Blades, supra note 22; Peck, supra note 7; Summers,
supra note 4; Note, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Termi-
nate Onlp in Good Faith, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1816 (1979) [hereinafter referred to as Harvard]; Note,
A Remedyfor Malicious Discharge of the At- Will Employee Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 7 CONN.
L. REV. 758 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as Connecticut]; STANFORD, supra note 21; Comment,
Employment at Will and the Law of Contracts, 23 BUFFALO L. REV. 211 (1974) [hereinafter re-
ferred to as Buffalo]; and Comment, New Hampshire Supreme Court Recognizes Cause ofAction
for Malicious Discharge-Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 8 CREIGHTON L. REV. 700 (1975).
66. Blades, supra note 22, at 1413, 1421-35. Blades analogizes this remedy to the protection
provided to automobile dealers whose franchises are wrongfully terminated. See Federal Auto-
mobile Dealer Franchise Act of 1956, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (1970).
67. See text accompanying notes 47-52 supra.
68. Blades, supra note 22, at 1422, 1435.
69. A number of states have enacted statutes which codify recent court decisions that protect
workers from dismissal for reasons that contravene public policy. See, e.g., [1980] LAB. L. REP.
(CCH) (I State Laws) 43,055 (state laws prohibiting discharge for failure to take a lie detector
test); [19801 LAB. L. REP. (CCH) (1 State Laws) 43,045 (state law prohibiting discharge for fail-
ure to exert political inluence). But see Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d
Cir. 1979) (applying Pennsylvania law) (despite law forbidding employer from requiring a poly-
graph as a condition of employment, the anti-public policy presumption may be overridden by a
demonstration that the employer had a separate, plausible and legitimate reason for the dis-
charge).
70. See, e.g., Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978);
Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975). But cf. Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390,
6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960) (discharge upheld although officer of corporation advised employee that it
was her duty to serve on jury but supervisor fired her for reporting for jury duty).
71. Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959),
is the first modern case to announce a public policy exception to the terminable at will rule.
72. Framptom v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973), was the first case
to recognize that an employee's dismissal for filing a workmen's compensation claim was in viola-
tion of public policy. Prior to such decisions, an employee's only remedy was in tort, although
80% of such cases were unsuccessful. Id. at 250 n.2, 297 N.E.2d at 427 n.2. The Framptom court
said that where the workmen, compensation law provided no remedy for reprisal, the statute must
be liberally construed so that the employee can exercise his rights. See also Kelsay v. Motorola,
Inc., 74 111. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Sventko v. Kroger, 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151
(1976). But cf. Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978), where employee was fired for filing a
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ployees. 73
The public policy exception to the at will rule, however, has not
been universally accepted. Some courts have been reluctant to em-
brace the new tort for fear of the "floodgate effect."7 4 Enthusiasm for
change through judicial revolution also has been tempered precisely
because the new tort rests upon public policy. For example, in Hinricks
v. Tranquilaire Hospital,7 5 where an employee was fired for refusing to
falisfy patients' medical records, the court held that public policy "is
too vague a concept to justify the creation of a new tort. Such creations
are best left to the legislature."
Other courts have refused to allow recovery for tortious discharge
absent a substantial violation of public policy. 76 In Geary v. United
States Steel Corp .,77 an employee was fired because he notified his em-
ployer that an unsafe product was being marketed. Although the prod-
uct was withdrawn from circulation, the court would not be
"beckon[ed] . ..into uncharted territory. '78 It found that "no clear
claim, the court held that he was compensated for his injury and whatever implied contractual
duty the employer owed him was satisfied.
The judicial finding that there is a remedy in tort for retaliatory discharge parallels recent
developments in landlord-tenant law where courts allow recovery for retaliatory eviction based on
tenants reporting housing code violations. See, e.g., Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir.
1968), the landmark case in which retaliatory eviction was recognized as an affirmative defense;
Aweeka v. Bonds, 20 Cal. App. 3d 278, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650 (1971) (retaliatory eviction is an affirma-
tive cause of action).
73. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., No. 53780 (111. April 17, 1981), where the plain-
tiff was fired because he blew the whistle on a co-employee for selling stolen goods. The Illinois
Supreme Court found the benefit to society derived from encouraging responsible citizen crime
fighting and cooperation with law enforcement authorities outweighed an employer's common law
right to discharge indefinite term employees at will.
74. Fear of "floodgating" refers to an argument sometimes raised by the judiciary that per-
mitting one particular claim or finding a new cause of action would invite a flood of similar
claims. An inference usually accompanies the "floodgate" argument that many of the subsequent
claims would lack merit and, therefore, the court's scarce resources would be wasted. See, e.g.,
Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 441 P.2d 912, 69 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1968) (negligent infliction of emo-
tional trauma and physical injury). See also Slocum v. Food Fair Stores, 100 So.2d 396 (Fla.
1958); Huston v. Freemansburg Borough, 212 Pa. 548, 61 A. 1022 (1905). Note, Educational Mal-
feasance. A New Cause of Actionfor Failure to Educate?, 14 TULSA L.J. 383, 395 n.75 (1978). The
"floodgate" argument has been criticized, however, on the ground that a primary responsibility of
the courts is to award damages based on an analysis of the merits of each individual case. This
duty should not be abrogated in exchange for administrative convenience. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal.
2d at 730, 441 P.2d at 924, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 71.
75. 352 So.2d 1130, 1131-32 (Ala. 1977).
76. Id. (employee's refusal to falsify medical records is not a sufficient violation of public
policy to justify recognizing a new tort); Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 417
A.2d 505 (1980) (public policy is not sufficiently affronted where a physician is fired for refusing to
test a controversial new drug); Campbell v. Ford Indus., Inc. 266 Or. 479, 513 P.2d 1153 (1973)
(where an employee who also was a stockholder was fired for asking to inspect the corporate
records, as provided for by law, the court held that there was no general concern to the public).
77. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
78. Id. at 174, 319 A.2d at 175.
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mandate of public policy [was] violated. ' 79 The court balanced the
magnitude of the affront to public policy caused by the discharge
against the probable impact of the tort on employer interests. The
Geary court concluded that the constant threat of suit for abusive dis-
charge would inhibit an employer from critically evaluating his
workforce.80
Consequently, the tort of abusive discharge has fallen short of Pro-
fessor Blades' expectations8' of providing relief to at will workers who
are discharged in violation of public policy. Moreover, even if the tort
were widely accepted, an arbitrary discharge of an at will employee,
neither maliciously motivated nor in violation of public policy, would
still not be actionable. For example, an employee who can allege only
that his dismissal stemmed from a single tardy arrival to work on a
morning when his supervisor was in a bad mood could not sustain a
cause of action in tort for abusive discharge. Such a discharge might be
unjust, but it would not be considered malicious and arguably it would
not violate the generally-accepted notion of public policy.
Cognizant of tort law's shortcomings, a number of commentators
82
have recently suggested alternative solutions to the problem of job pro-
tection for the at will employee. Some have proposed the need for a
statute which would provide for arbitration of unjust discharge
claims;83 others have suggested causes of action founded upon due pro-
79. Id. at 185, 319 A.2d at 180.
80. Id. at 181-82, 319 A.2d at 179.
81. See Blades, supra note 22.
82. Tort law is superior to contract law, however, where non-pecuniary damages result from
the discharge. For example, an employee may sometimes recover punitive damages and for emo-
tional harm, damages which are unavailable in contract law. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,
74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978) (punitive damages); Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 371 Mass.
140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976) (emotional harm). The majority view is that unemployed insurance
benefits collected by a discharged employee need not be deducted from a contractual recovery.
See, e.g., Billetter v. Posell, 94 Cal. App. 2d 858, 211 P.2d 621 (1949); Sporn v. Celebrity, Inc., 129
N.J. Super. 449, 324 A.2d 71 (1974). The minority view is that a set-off is required to avoid unjust
enrichment. See, e.g., Denhart v. Waukesha Brewing Co., 21 Wis. 2d 583, 124 N.W.2d 664 (1963).
A California appellate court recently ruled that an at will employee who is discharged with-
out cause has a cause of action both in tort for wrongful dismissal and in contract for breach of an
implied duty of good faith and fair dealing. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610
P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
83. See generally Summers, supra note 4. Although early in this century a Texas law requir-
ing that a corporation could not discharge employees without cause was declared an unconstitu-
tional violation of freedom of contract and equal protection in St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v.
Griffin, 106 Tex. 477, 171 S.W. 703 (1914), federal and state laws which protect some workers
from unjust discharge subsequently were passed. See notes 61-67 supra. Other commentators
discount the likelihood that a national law will be passed to protect the job security of all workers.
Peck, supra note 7, at 3, and Blackburn, supra note 22, at 492, argue that the at will worker is
unorganized and, therefore, without a lobby. This is in contrast to organized labor's successful
campaign to win freedom from discharge due to union activity. Moreover, employer associations
are strong and may be counted on to oppose any congressional action that would curtail employer
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cess and equal protection 84 or on property rights in employment princi-
ples. 85 Still others have advocated that contract law, notwithstanding
the stumbling blocks it has presented thus far to at will employees,
could be the most effective theory on which to base unjust dismissal
claims.8
6
CONTRACTS To DISCHARGE IN GOOD FAITH OR WITH JUST CAUSE
Good Faith." An Employer's Subjective State of Mind
There are two contractual standards by which an at will employee
might be sheltered from wrongful discharge: good faith and just cause.
A number of courts hold that every contract contains an implied obli-
discharge discretion. Furthermore, organized labor has no incentive to organize for a statute
which would neutralize its argument in support of unionization, i.e., to protect workers from un-
just discharge. Peck, supra note 7, at 3; Blackburn, 5upra note 22, at 492.
84. See generally Peck, supra note 7, for a discussion of possible protections from unjust
discharge predicated on constitutional law. The theory developed by Peck is that the fourteenth
amendment could be applied to employees working for a private corporation which hold a state
charter or who have government contracts, thus giving rise to the inference that the discharge
amounted to state action. An example of a successful recovery for unjust discharge based upon
state action is Holodnak v. Arco Corp., 514 F.2d 285, 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 892
(1975). The Holodnak court said that where most of the buildings, land, machinery and equip-
ment at the employer's plant were federally owned, nearly all of the work done at the plant was
defense related and the Department of Defense kept a large force at the plant to oversee opera-
tions, the nexus between the employer and the federal government established a symbiotic rela-
tionship such as to make the employer's action in firing an employee because she published an
article critical of the employer state action within the purview of the 14th amendment.
85. See Buffalo, supra note 69, at 212-13. There is some historical support for the argument
that there is a property right in employment. In Dorrington v. Manning, 135 Pa. Super. 194, 201,
4 A.2d 886, 890 (1939), the court held that "[t]he right to work,. . . in a general sense, constitutes
a property right, the continued interference with which equity will enjoin where the legal remedy
is inadequate."
The notion that there may be a current property right in employment is best tested against
four recent United States Supreme Court decisions relating to public employees. In Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972), the Court refused to recognize plaintiff schoolteacher's
claim that he was denied a rehiring without due process of law. In dicta, however, the Court said
that a property right in public employment might derive from a legitimate expectation of contin-
ued employment grounded in federal or state law or in a school's rule or policy. In Perry v.
Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602 (1972), the Supreme Court found that a college's policy was suffi-
cient to create a defacto entitlement to rehire where no system of tenure was in place. In Arnett v.
Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 155-56 (1974), the Supreme Court held that federal law had created a
property interest in government employment, but that that interest was governed by statutory
conditions. The plaintiff in Arnett was removed from his job in accordance with the statutory
conditions and his discharge, therefore, was proper. Finally, in Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344
(1976), the Supreme Court narrowed the grounds upon which a property right in public employ-
ment might rest: such right must be established by reference to state (and presumably federal)
law. Thus, the promise of Roth and Sizdermann, that a property right in public employment
might be based upon reasonable reliance on an employer's policies and work rules, is unrealized.
It is even less probable that a property right in private employment, absent expressed statutory
creation, will be recognized.
86. See, e.g., Blackburn, supra note 22; Harvard, supra note 69; Stanford, supra note 21.
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gation to deal fairly and in good faith.87 Good faith, however, is a
subjective concept without precise meaning. It encompasses, among
other things, "an honest belief, the absence of malice and the absence
of design to defraud or to seek an unconscionable advantage."88
If a duty to execute a contract in good faith is imposed, the em-
ployer's ability to discharge is circumscribed in accordance with that
duty. An employer will be held liable for lost wages due to a discharge
made in bad faith. In effect, where a duty of good faith is implied, the
employment contract is converted into a satisfaction contract 8 9 in
which the parties agree that successful performance is measured by the
employer's subjective satisfaction. In a suit for breach, the employer
need only establish that he was dissatisfied with the employee's per-
formance as the predicate to discharge; he need not show that his judg-
ment was reasonable. The jury's role is to determine whether the
dissatisfaction was sincere and not claimed in bad faith as a pretext for
another reason.90
The leading case in which a duty to discharge an indefinite term
employee in good faith was implied is Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co .91 In
Monge, an employee in an unionized plant92 was allegedly discharged
for refusing to date her foreman. The New Hampshire Supreme Court
held that "a termination by the employer of a contract of employment
at will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation
is not in the best interest of the economic system or the public good and
87. See, e.g., Moore v. Home Ins. Co., 601 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1979); Fortune v. National
Cash Register Co., 377 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H.
130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); Beers v. Atlas Assurance Co., 215 Wis. 165, 253 N.E. 584 (1934). See
also Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980),
where the court held that an indefinite term employee who is discharged without cause has a cause
of action for breach of an implied duty of good faith, as well as an action in tort for wrongful
discharge; U.C.C. § 1-203 (1978), which requires that all contracts to buy and sell goods be exe-
cuted in good faith; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 231 (Tentative draft No. 7 1972).
88. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 623 (5th ed. 1979).
89. 3A CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 684, at 229 (1960).
90. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 623, 292
N.W.2d 880, 895 (1980); Lake Shore & Western Ry. v. Tierney, 8 Ohio C.C. (m.s.) 521, 29 Ohio
C.C. 83, afrd, 75 Ohio St. 565, 80 N.E. 1128 (1905). See also J. MURRAY, MURRAY ON CON-
TRACTS § 152 (2d ed. 1974).
91. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
92. It is unclear why the grievance procedure agreed to in the collective bargaining agree-
ment was bypassed in Monge. Arguably, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967), required that sum-
mary judgment be granted to the employer. In Sipes, the United States Supreme Court said that a
private cause of action did not arise until the employee had exhausted the grievance procedure.
But the Sipes Court also stated that an employee might sue directly in court upon a showing that
the grievance procedure would be totally useless or that the employer had repudiated the collec-
tive bargaining agreement. Id. at 184-85. Neither exception is apparent in Monge. See also Con-
necticut, supra note 69, at 768-69.
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constitutes a breach of the employment contract. 93
Although Monge extends job protection to at will employees, it is
more deferential to employers than is the discharge requirement of a
standard satisfaction contract. Under Monge, an employer need not
claim to be dissatisfied with his employee's work so long as the under-
lying reason for the dismissal is not colored by bad faith, malice or
retaliation.
94
In addition to providing some security for the at will employee, the
duty to discharge in good faith is said to be fair to both parties. 95 It is
fair to the employee because the court merely provides a missing term
which the contracting parties would have included in a written contract
if the parties had been of equal bargaining power. This view recog-
nizes the prohibitive cost of negotiating individual employment con-
tracts96 and the inability of the average, nonunion employee to coerce
his employer into providing favorable discharge terms. 97 It is also pur-
portedly fair to the employer because he is not required to retain an
unsatisfactory worker nor to suffer economically by the requirement.
Thus, an employer who dismisses or lays off an employee because of
accumulating inventory during a business slump is not acting in bad
faith.
However, because the good faith standard only requires a subjec-
tive dissatisfaction on the employer's part before discharging an em-
ployee,98 it affords less protection to the at will employee than the good
93. 114 N.H. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551.
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe, 114 N.H. at 136, 316 A.2d at 551; Harvard, supra note 63, at
1831-33. But see Jones v. Keogh, 409 A.2d 581 (Vt. 1979) (duty of good faith in Monge should
only be implied where there is a clear and compelling violation of public policy).
96. See Harvard, supra note 69, at 1831-32.
97. This is in contrast to a union employee who has at his disposal the lawful tools of strik-
ing, picketing, boycotts and handbilling with which to coerce the employer into granting favorable
terms.
98. See text accompanying note 118 infra. This is, perhaps, a simplistic analysis of the good
faith approach. In practice, applying the good faith standard may result in an effect similar to the
good cause standard for termination. In Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., Ill Cal. App. 3d 443,
168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980), a California Court of Appeal described the good faith standard relative
to dismissals as one which varies according to the circumstances of employment. For example, the
Cleary court said that an employer's honest dissatisfaction with a long-term employee's perform-
ance would not be a sufficient reason for a termination under the good faith test. Id. at 449, 168
Cal. Rptr. at 729-30. A proper reason would be one that approaches the good cause test. See text
accompanying notes 107-17 infra. Realistically, therefore, the good faith standard is multivariate,
depending for its definition on such factors as the employee's term of service, the difficulty, dan-
gerousness or cost of the performance sought and the employee's status in the organizational hier-
archy. See, e.g., Harvard, supra note 69, at 1840-41.
Another example of a situation in which the good faith and good cause standards for termi-
nation are minimally different as applied is where an employee argues under the good faith stan-
dard, that an employer's averred dissatisfaction is a pretext for another, unlawful reason. If the
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cause standard.
Just Cause. An Objective Standard
"Just or good cause" is some substantial misbehavior on the part
of the employee which is recognized both at law and by sound public
opinion as good grounds for dismissal.99 Examples of behavior which
might justify a just cause dismissal are dishonesty, disloyalty, absentee-
ism, insubordination, intoxication, misconduct and violation of com-
pany or safety rules. to Although purportedly objective, the standards
for judging such behavior are inexact.101 Not every act of insubordina-
tion or misconduct would give rise to just cause for discharge 0 2 but
repeated acts, not alone sufficient cause for dismissal, may accumulate
so as to provide just cause. 10 3 Moreover, just cause will be found only
where an employee knows that the challenged behavior is prohibited.
An exception may arise, however, where a rule has not been uniformly
enforced such that some employees who have violated the rule have not
been discharged or have been given lesser penalties than others with
comparable work and disciplinary records who have violated the same
rule. In these situations, a just cause discharge for the latter employees
will generally not be sustained.' 04
Under traditional contract theory, just cause would be measured
by whether the objectionable act amounted to a material breach of con-
tract. 105 Materiality is as imprecise a term as is just cause, however,
employer merely rests his defense upon the strength of his subjective dissatisfaction with the em-
ployee's performance, without an objective standard for measuring that performance, the em-
ployer's credibility in a factual determination will be diminished. If, however, the employer can
give a reason for the dismissal which approaches good cause, it will be harder for the employee to
sustain a charge that the employer acted in bad faith.
99. See, e.g., In re Gage, 383 A.2d 204 (Vt. 1979); In re Brooks, 382 A.2d 297 (Vt. 1977);
RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 275, at 403 (1932); See also Keserich v. Carnegie-Ill. Steel Corp.,
163 F.2d 889 (7th Cir. 1947) (just cause need not be legal cause but such cause as a fair minded
person might act upon, and not in an arbitrary fashion).
100. See Summers, supra note 4, at 499 n. 104; TWA v. Beaty, 402 F. Supp. 652 (S.D.N.Y.
1975) (failure to successfully complete training course is cause); Carter v. United States, 407 F.2d
1238 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (immorality); Berry v. Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co., 242 S.E.2d 551 (S.
Car. 1978) (disloyalty).
101. Despite the elusive quality of "just cause," arbitrators have built a body of both substan-
tive and procedural law governing the union shop on those bare words in a collective bargaining
agreement. Summers, supra note 4, at 500; see generally, F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBI-
TRATION WORKS (3rd ed. 1973).
102. See, e.g., Resilient Floor & Decorating Covering Workers, Local 1179 v. Welco Mfg. Co.,
542 F.2d 1029 (8th Cir. 1976) (if just cause means every act of insubordination by an employee
who has served faithfully for years, then no employee will benefit from a just cause claim in his
contract).
103. See, e.g, In re Brooks, 382 A.2d 204 (Vt. 1977).
104. Summers, supra note 4, at 500-08.
105. 4 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 946 (1951); cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY 2d § 409(1)
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and its meaning varies according to the status of the employee and the
type of performance sought. Consequently, whether an employee's act
was material enough to constitute a breach of duty would depend upon
whether it was done wilfully, negligently or innocently.106
Theoretically, then, the good cause standard provides more protec-
tion from unjust discharge than does the good faith standard because
the good cause standard is more difficult to satisfy. Under the good
faith standard, an employer need only demonstrate his subjective belief
that an employee is performing badly to substantiate his discharge of
that employee. Under a good cause standard, however, the employer
must show that the employee failed to measure up to objective per-
formance criteria which have been previously set out by the employer
or which are common in the industry.
Consequently, unlike the good faith standard where the employer
could rely on his own reasonable, but subjective evaluations for dismis-
sal, an employee's discharge under a good cause standard could only be
justified where the employer could prove that the employee breached
some objective, clearly-established standards of performance. In Tous-
saint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan ,107 the Michigan Supreme
Court further explored the indefinite term employee's contractual right
not to be discharged except for cause.
TOUSSAINT v BLUE CROSS & BLUE SHIELD OF MICHIGAN
408 Mich. 598, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980)
Statement of the Case
Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan is a consolida-
tion for appeal of two cases: Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of
Michigan 10 8 and Ebling v. Masco Corp.109 In Toussaint, Charles Tous-
saint was hired as an administrative assistant to the treasurer of Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan. When he was hired, Toussaint asked
about job security and he was told that "'as long as [he] did [his] job
[he] would be with the company until mandatory retirement at age
and 259 Comment (b) (1957) (a serious violation of the duty of loyalty or of obedience by the
employee may constitute a breach of the contract although the resulting harm is quite small).
106. See, e.g., Thomas v. Bourdette, 45 Or. App. 195, 608 P.2d 178 (1980) (acts which are
material violations and, therefore, cause for dismissal of a manager are quantitatively and qualita-
tively distinct from those required to terminate an employee possessing lesser responsibility and
discretion); see also RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 275, at 403 (1932).
107. 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.w.2d 880 (1980).
108. 79 Mich. App. 429, 262 N.W.2d 848 (1977).
109. 79 Mich. App. 531, 261 N.W.2d 74 (1977).
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65. "110 Toussaint was handed a Supervisory Manual which provided
that all non-probationary employees would only be dismissed for just
cause and in accordance with specified procedures and policies applica-
ble to all areas, divisions and departments."' Five years later, Tous-
saint was fired. He alleged that his discharge was without cause and in
violation of his employment contract, certain terms of which were set
forth in the manual. Blue Cross claimed that no employment contract
existed because the manual was simply intended as a management
guide for supervisors" t2 and it did not contain the elements of a con-
tract. Moreover, Blue Cross argued that, although an at will employee
could be discharged for any reason, Toussaint was fired for good
cause." 13 At trial, a jury verdict for $72,835.52 was rendered for Tous-
saint.
The court of appeal reversed that judgment, holding that the
plaintiff could not recover under either a definite or indefinite term
contract theory."t 4 The court said that if the contract was to last until
110. 408 Mich. at 597 n.5, 292 N.W.2d at 884 n.5 (emphasis added). Whether age "65" ex-
pressly was mentioned at the hiring as opposed to "until retirement age" was an issue at the trial
and appellate levels, but not certified for appeal to the Michigan Supreme Court. At best, the
record is confusing. In his summation to the jury, Toussaint's lawyer denied that any term was
specified and, therefore, that the contract was for an indefinite duration. 408 Mich. at 639-40 n.2,
292 N.W.2d at 904 n.2. In effect, Toussaint was on the horns of a dilemma. If the hiring was
indefinite, the traditional view of employment contracts was that the contract was terminable at
will, and that he could be discharged without good cause. If, however, the hiring was for a defi-
nite term-until Toussaint reached 65-Toussaint could be fired only for cause. See text accom-
panying note I supra. But, an oral contract for a definite duration in excess of one year could not
be enforced because it would run afoul of the statute of frauds. An indefinite term oral contract is
not barred by the statute of frauds because it can be performed within one year. See, e.g., Stauter
v. Walnut Grove Prods., 188 N.W.2d 305 (Iowa 1971); Roxanna Petroleum Co. v. Rice, 107 Okla.
161, 235 P. 502 (1924); But see Rubenstein v. Klevan, 261 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1958) (applying New
York law) (contract for "lifetime employment" in contrast to one for "permanent employment" is
within the provision of the statute of frauds). Presumably, Toussaint chose to challenge the pre-
vailing law by asserting that his contract was for an indefinite term and that, based upon his
employer's promises and policies, he could not be dismissed without good cause.
I1ll. Except for cases of serious misbehavior which might warrant summary dismissal, the
disciplinary procedure included, in sequence, a verbal warning, written warning, probation and
termination. 408 Mich. at 651-62, 292 N.W. at 909-15.
112. Id. at 644, 292 N.W.2d at 906. There was testimony to the effect that Toussaint had never
been responsible for supervising employees and, therefore, that the manual could not have been
given to him for supervisory purposes. Blue Cross contended that Toussaint was not given the
manual until after his hiring and that he was given the manual because one of his duties was to
keep it current by adding and deleting pages.
113. It was alleged that Toussaint was fired, after he was asked to resign, because he could not
get along with his co-employees and had mismanaged the company motor pool. 408 Mich. at 637,
292 N.W.2d at 902-03. A perusal of Blue Cross' brief indicates that Toussaint might have been
implicated in a fraudulent scheme involving tampering with odometers in the company cars. It is
unexplained, therefore, why Blue Cross did not more aggressively assert the defense of good
cause. A possible explanation, if in fact the odometer readings were changed, is that Blue Cross
did not want to call attention to the irregularities.
114. 79 Mich. App. at 438, 262 N.W.2d at 852.
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Toussaint was 65, it was definite in duration. Accordingly, it would be
barred by the statute of frauds which provides that an oral contract
which by its terms cannot be performed within one year is unenforce-
able. The appellate court also reasoned that if the contract was for an
indefinite term, then the employment relationship was one at will. The
court further said that the employment contract could not be modified
to provide that a discharge be for cause unless the employee paid some
consideration beyond his bargained for service.' 
15
In Ebling, Walter Ebling was hired as a Director of Marketing of
Masco Corporation. After negotiations, Ebling agreed to accept the
position and leave his then-current job upon assurances that the Masco
hiring officer would personally review his performance. Ebling was
told that "he would not be discharged if he was doing his job."" 6
Among the benefits promised to Ebling was an option to purchase
Masco stock, which was to vest after three years of employment.
Ebling was fired after two years and two months. In an action for
breach of contract, he claimed that he had been discharged without
cause in violation of the agreement to prevent him from exercising the
stock option which had become quite valuable. ' 17 A jury verdict for
$300,000 was rendered for Ebling. On appeal, Masco contended that
employment for an indefinite term is at will and cannot be made other-
wise unless the employee furnishes special consideration to the em-
ployer. In a per curiam opinion, the appellate court affirmed the
verdict in favor of Ebling. The court said that the correct statement of
the exceptions to the at will rule is that distinguishing features,
promises, or consideraiton in addition to services remove a case from
the general rule."18 The court found that the distinguishing feature of
Ebling's contract was the negotiated promise of a discharge only for
cause. Therefore, the jury should have rendered judgment in his favor.
Reasoning of the Majority Opinion
On further appeal, the Supreme Court of Michigan found that
Toussaint and Ebling--employees with oral contracts of indefinite
term-could not be discharged without good cause. 19 Accordingly,
the judgment of the court of appeal was reversed in Toussaint and af-
115. Id. at 435, 262 N.W.2d at 851.
116. 408 Mich. at 597 n.5, 292 N.w.2d at 884 n.5.
117. Id. at 634, 292 N.w.2d at 901.
118. 79 Mich. App. at 533, 261 N.w.2d at 74.
119. 408 Mich. at 598, 292 N.w.2d at 885. Justice Levin wrote the majority opinion, joined by
Justices Kavanagh, Wiliams and Moody.
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firmed in Ebling. The Toussaint court held that a promise to discharge
only for cause may be incorporated into the employment contract ei-
ther by express oral or written agreement or based upon an employee's
legitimate expectations grounded in the employer's policy. 20 The
court further held that such a promise is enforceable even though no
mutual intention to create contract rights in the employee existed,
neither party had signed the statement, the policy could be amended
unilaterally by the employer any time subsequent to the hiring, and the
employee had not learned of the policy until after the hiring.' 2' The
court, however, did not prohibit the making of contracts expressly ter-
minable at will. 122 Neither did it require good cause for dismissal ab-
sent some evidence of the parties' intent.
The majority's reasoning is in three parts. First, the court deter-
mined that the rule that an indefinite term employment contract is ter-
minable in the discretion of either party was a rule of construction and
not of substantive law. It is notper se illegal to provide contractually
that an indefinite term employee may be discharged only for good
cause. Rather, if the term of employment is indefinite, a presumption is
raised that either party may end the relationship in his discretion, ab-
sent -evidence of contrary intentions. Second, the court considered
whether an employer's statement of policy alone might give rise to en-
forceable rights in the employee. Third, the court discussed the proper
role for the jury where the plaintiff alleges that he was discharged with-
out cause in violation of his contract.
Terminable At Will- A Rule of Construction
The Michigan Supreme Court denied that Toussaint was a depar-
ture from settled law or that it was legislating by judicial fiat. 123 The
court said that those courts which have mechanically applied the at will
rule "have misapplied language and principles found in earlier cases
where the courts merely were attempting to discover and implement
the intentions of the parties." 124 To support this proposition, the Tous-
saint court examined Wood's rule125 and subsequent leading cases. 126
120. Id.
121. Id. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
122. Id. at 610, 292 N.W.2d at 890.
123. Id. at 600, 292 N.W.2d at 885.
124. Id.
125. See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
126. Perry v. Wheeler, 75 Ky. 541 (1877); Lord v. Goldberg, 81 Cal. 596, 22 P. 1126 (1889);
Louisville & N.R. v. Offutt, 99 Ky. 427, 36 S.W. 181 (1896); Sullivan v. Detroit, Y. & A.A. Ry.,
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Included in the Toussaint court's review were Perry v. Wheeler127 and
Lord v. Goldberg, 28 early cases which modified the at will rule to re-
quire that a discharge from an indefinite term employment be made
fairly and for cause. 2 9 According to the Michigan Supreme Court,
subsequent decisions, ostensibly based upon Perry and Lord, ignored
the caveat that terminations must be effected "upon equitable terms" or
"for some good reason."'
130
The court pointed to Adolph v. Cookware Co.131 to underscore an-
other way in which the at will rule was subverted. According to the
Toussaint court, the Michigan Supreme Court in Adolph had errone-
ously cited Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, another Michigan case, 132 for the
proposition that unless the employee pays consideration in addition to
his proffered services, permanent employment is terminable at will. 133
But the Lynas rule is that there are three exceptions which will defeat
the rule that an indefinite term contract is at will: distinguishing fea-
tures, provisions or extra consideration. 1
34
So stated, the rule of indefinite contracts only raises a presumption
of terminability which an employee may rebut. According to the Tous-
saint court, it is a rule of construction rather than a principle of sub-
stantive law. 135 A rule of construction, in this context, signals a court to
construe the contract by looking beyond its face to the parties' true
intentions. 136 It does not prevent the court from finding that the parties
sought to limit the employer's discharge discretion despite the indefi-
nite term of the contract.
Accordingly, the Michigan Supreme Court found the oral assur-
ances of job security made to Toussaint and Ebling to be features
which distinguished their employment contracts from other indefinite
term contracts. Unquestionably, the court said, had those promises
been memorialized in writing, the terms would have been enforcea-
ble. 137 Similarly, oral promises such as those expressed in Toussaint
135 Mich. 661, 98 N.W. 756 (1904); Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 273 N.W. 315 (1937);
and Adolph v. Cookware Co., 283 Mich. 561, 278 N.W. 687 (1938).
127. 75 Ky. 541 (1877). See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
128. 81 Cal. 596, 22 P. 1126 (1889). See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
129. See text accompanying notes 28-36 supra.
130. 408 Mich. at 604, 292 N.W.2d at 888. See text accompanying notes 32-33 supra.
131. 283 Mich. 561, 278 N.W. 687 (1938).
132. 279 Mich. 684, 273 N.W. 315 (1937).
133. 283 Mich. at 568, 278 N.W. at 688.
134. 279 Mich. at 687, 273 N.W. at 316-17.
135. 408 Mich. at 599-600, 292 N.W.2d at 885. Substantive law creates duties, rights and
obligations. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1281 (5th ed. 1979).
136. See, e.g., Dutton v. Pugh, 45 N.J. Ch. 426, 18 A. 207 (1889).
137. 408 Mich. at 611, 292 N.W.2d at 890.
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may be sufficient to overcome the presumption that an indefinite term
contract is at will.
An Employer's Statements of Policy May Be Enforceable
The Toussaint court concluded that the terms of the manual were
incorporated into Toussaint's employment contract and that the man-
ual's provisions were independently actionable. 38 The court rejected
as irrelevant Blue Cross' claim that Toussaint could not have relied
upon their discharge policy since he was not given the manual until
after the actual hiring. 139 Rather, the court said, an employee may be
eligible for his employer's benefits even though he has not bargained
for them and neither party has signed the statement of policy. More-
over, the employee need not learn of the specific policy until he seeks to
invoke it in his behalf.140 In the court's view, the employee is justified
in relying on a general image of fair treatment which the employer has
intentionally created through his general policies. Convincing employ-
ees that they will be treated fairly is precisely why the employer pub-
lishes policies relating to discharge procedures and other terms and
conditions of employment.14' It enables the employer to attract an or-
derly and cooperative work force. Consequently, where an employer
has created an atmosphere which is "instinct with obligation," he may
not treat his promises as illusory.142
In holding that an employee could legitimately rely on his em-
ployer's policy statements regarding job security, however, the Tous-
saint court did not limit the employer's right to change a policy. Nor
did it require an employer to give notice of an impending change. The
court said that an employer could publicize his reserved right to alter or
suspend a policy in his discretion. In such a case, employees are put on
notice that they cannot rely forever upon any one policy. But, the Tous-
saint court said, while a policy is in force, it must be uniformly ap-
plied. 143
138. Id. at 612-15, 292 N.W.2d at 891-92.
139. Id.
140. 408 Mich. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892. Although the parties disagreed about whether
Toussaint received the manual before or after the moment of the hiring, Blue Cross did not claim
that Toussaint learned of the discharge policy only after he was fired. The Michigan Supreme
Court's holding that an employee need not learn of the policy until he seeks to invoke it in his
behalf, therefore, is an alternative holding. Moreover, it may be supported only by a strained
usage of the promissory estoppel doctrine. See notes 179-80 infra and accompanying text.
141. Id. at 613, 292 N.W.2d at 892.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 619, 292 N.W.2d at 894-95.
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The Jury's Role in Determining Good Cause
The Toussaint court considered two possible roles for the jury in
its review of discharge for cause: to determine whether the dismissal
was reasonable under the circumstances or to determine whether the
cause was the kind that indicates that the employee no longer was do-
ing the job. The court rejected the alternative that a jury could find a
breach only if the employer's decision was unreasonable.1'" It rea-
soned that under a contract terminable only for cause the employee has
secured more than the employer's promise to act reasonably or in good
faith. He has received a promise that he will not be discharged except
for cause. The Michigan Supreme Court endorsed the second jury role
described above in order to give effect to that promise.
The Toussaint court indicated that an employer can minimize the
jury's role by establishing and uniformly applying work rules. Where
his rules and standards for performance are clear, the jury decides only
whether the employee broke the rule. 145 If he did, the employer's own
rule is the standard by which good cause is measured. The court said,
however, that where rules are not articulated or are vague or selectively
enforced, the jury is assigned the task of determining whether the ob-
jectionable behavior amounted to good cause for the dismissal. 46
The Dissenting Opinion
The same three judges 147 who concurred 48 in Ebling dissented to
the favorable judgment in Toussaint. First, the dissent found that the
oral promise of job security made to Toussaint was not the result of
bargaining between Toussaint and Blue Cross. According to the dis-
sent, this distinguished Toussaint's case from Ebling's. In Toussaint,
the employee merely asked about security on the day of the hiring and
was told that he would not be fired if he did his job. In contrast, Ebling
was described by the dissent as having engaged in prolonged negotia-
144. Id. at 622-23, 292 N.w.2d at 896.
145. Id. at 623-24, 292 N.W.2d at 897.
146. Id.
147. Justice Ryan wrote the concurring opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Coleman and
Justice Fitzgerald.
148. The differences between the concurring and majority opinions are slight. First, the con-
currence disagreed with the majority's assertion that mutuality of obligation was unnecessary in a
contract as long as valid consideration was present. According to the concurrence, mutuality of
obligation is not required for unilateral contracts such as employment contracts. For bilateral
contracts, however, mutuality of obligation is still necessary to enforce the contract. 408 Mich. at
600, 292 N.w.2d at 885. Second, the concurrence felt that Ebling's contract was enforceable be-
cause it was marked by "distinguishing features" which, according to Michigan law, made it not at
will. Id. at 633-34, 292 N.w.2d at 901.
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tions concerning job security.' 49 The bargain struck by Ebling and
Masco during a number of pre-employment meetings was that if
Ebling's work was unsatisfactory, his immediate supervisor personally
would review Ebling's performance and would give Ebling a chance to
correct his performance. Ebling also was assured that he would not be
fired without good cause.' 50
Second, the dissent found neither direct nor circumstantial evi-
dence from which a jury could have concluded that Blue Cross' dis-
charge policy was integrated into Toussaint's employment contract.'
5 '
The dissent agreed with the majority that a policy statement sometimes
may become part of an employment contract where an employee justi-
fiably relies upon the employer's statement. However, that reasonable
reliance must be predicated on the employee's awareness of the prom-
ise. A promise may not become a contractual term by inadvertence
since each party must manifest assent to the term. 52 Thus, the dissent
disputed the majority's alternative holding that an employer's state-
ment of policy may give rise to contractual rights in an employee even
where the employee is unaware of the policy.
153
According to the dissent, the majority's holding that an employee
may enforce a policy of which he was unaware is based upon inappo-
site precedent. The cases which the majority cited 154 as support do not
deal with termination of at will employees but with employees' entitle-
ment to accrued benefits such as severance and vacation pay. The dis-
sent said that in the cited cases the employee had paid consideration by
performing the requested services. Hence, the employer was obligated
to pay what was owed to the employee. The dissent contrasted the
earned benefits in these cases with the promise to discharge only for
cause in Toussaint because the promise to discharge for cause is not
earned as a result of a specific period of service. In the dissent's view, a
promise to pay accrued benefits also differs from a promise to discharge
for cause because "an employer should reasonably expect that a prom-
ise of deferred compensation would induce reliance while a promise of
149. 408 Mich. at 641 n.4, 292 N.W.2d at 904 n.4.
150. Id. at 633-34, 292 N.W.2d at 901.
151. Id. at 645, 292 N.W.2d at 907.
152. Id at 646-47, 292 N.W.2d at 907.
153. See note 180 infra and accompanying text.
154. The cases are: Cain v. Allen Elec. & Equip. Co., 346 Mich. 568, 78 N.W.2d 296 (1956);
Psutka v. Michigan Alkali Co., 274 Mich. 318, 264 N.W. 385 (1936); Gaydos v. White Motor
Corp., 54 Mich. App. 143, 220 N.W.2d 697 (1974); Clarke v. Brunswick Corp., 48 Mich. App. 667,
211 N.W.2d 101 (1973); and Couch v. Administrative Comm. of the Difco Labs, Inc., 44 Mich.
App. 44, 205 N.W.2d 24 (1972).
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job security would not."' 55
Analysis of the Majority Holding
The common law rule that an indefinite term employment contract
is terminable at the will of either party has subjected many employees
to arbitrary and capricious discharge. In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Michigan, the Michigan Supreme Court may have afforded
job protection to a significant number of Michigan's at will workers
whose discharges would not otherwise be protected by statute or judi-
cial decision. Alternatively, the gain in employment security may
prove to be fleeting because Toussaint may signal employers to make
indefinite term employment contracts expressly terminable at will.
The significance of Toussaint is three-fold: an employer's express
oral or written promise not to discharge an indefinite term employee
except for cause is enforceable; provisions of a personnel manual or
other statements of employer policy independently can give rise to en-
forceable rights in the employee; and an employer's statement of policy
can create contractual rights even though the employee is unaware of
the specific policy.
The first part of the court's holding-an employer will be bound
by his express promise to discharge for cause-is not a radical depar-
ture from settled law and, in fact, is grounded in Michigan employment
law.156 The Michigan Supreme Court became convinced by an analy-
sis of past decisions that an indefinite term employment contract is not
per se terminable at will. The court said that such employment raises a
presumption that either party may sever it at his discretion, which
prevails unless the parties can show that they intended otherwise.
Therefore, the Toussaint court correctly concluded that evidence could
support jury findings that the parties intended that Toussaint's and
Ebling's employment would not be at will. The court cited evidence of
promises of job security made to Ebling and Toussaint, both at their
respective hirings and in a personnel manual, as features which distin-
guished their contracts sufficiently to rebut the at will presumptions.
The Michigan Supreme Court also reviewed, but thereafter ig-
nored, the holdings in Perry v. Wheeler 57 and Lord v. Goldberg, 58
leading cases which explained the nature of permanent employment as
155. 408 Mich. at 598, 648-49, 292 N.W.2d at 884, 908.
156. See Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 273 N.W. 315 (1937).
157. 75 Ky. 541 (1877).
158. 81 Cal. 596, 22 P. 1126 (1889).
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promised to an employee of indefinite term. The Toussaint court cited
Perry and Lord for the proposition that indefinite term employment
may be ended at the will of either party-but only for good cause. 159
Based on its review of Perry and Lord, the Toussaint court could have
announced that the correct statement of the rule of indefinite term em-
ployment is that such employment is presumed to be not terminable
without cause absent intent to the contrary. The Michigan Supreme
Court, however, opted for a conservative position, by merely holding
that a court must give effect to the intentions of the parties in an indefi-
nite term employment contract. Only where the parties indicate an ex-
press intent to limit discharges to those made only for cause will the
presumption that an indefinite term exployment contract is at will be
overruled.
This holding also squares with the doctrine of partial performance
as applied to unilateral contracts.' 60 In a unilateral employment con-
tract, the employer seeks the performance of the employee. The em-
ployer may not revoke the offer of employment once the employee has
partially performed some of the requested service. 161 In such situa-
tions, the employee cannot be terminated without cause even though he
has made no return promise to work for a specific period and has not
relinquished the power to quit at his discretion. 162 Even where the em-
ployee exercises his right to suspend performance, the employee is not
in breach because a unilateral contract is not formed until the em-
ployee has completed the performance sought. Thus, in Toussaint v.
Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, the Michigan Supreme Court
merely introduced into the employment relationship the standard prin-
ciples of unilateral contracts which had long been applied in commeri-
cal contexts.
The second part of the holding in Toussaint-that an employer's
statement of policy independently can create contractual rights in the
employee-also comports with principles of contract law. The Michi-
can Supreme Court found that Toussaint could enforce the discharge
policies set forth in Blue Cross' personnel manual, regardless of
whether he had been promised job security after or prior to his hiring.
Although the court did not specify the precise theoretical basis upon
which the holding rests, this portion of the opinion is closer to promis-
159. See notes 28-36 supra and accompanying text.
160. IA CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 152, at 13-15 (1963).
161. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 45, at 53 (Tentative Draft No. 7 1972).
162. An offer also might become irrevocable where the employee gives consideration or relies
on the offer. Id. § 89B (2).
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sory estoppel analysis than it is to partial performance theory. The
doctrine of promissory estoppel is applicable where no bargained for
consideration can be found to support a contract, but where a party
reasonably has relied upon a promise to his detriment. 163 Moreover,
the promise must be of the sort that the promisor reasonably would
believe to be capable of inducing reliance in the promisee.
Thus, the Toussaint court emphasized that the employer had made
promises of job security and discharge procedures in the personnel
manual which were directed toward the entire workforce. In the
court's view, these promises not only were capable of inducing reason-
able reliance in the employee, but the employer's very purpose for cre-
ating the policies was to convince the employees that they could rely
upon the employer to deal fairly with them. Arguably, the employee
forebore from seeking employment elsewhere because of his reliance
on his employer's policies. Consequently, if the employer refuses to
follow through on these policies, the employee is unjustly deprived of
the promised benefits and the employer has breached his implied
promise to provide these benefits.
The third, and possibly most significant, result of Toussaint is that
an employee may be unaware of the employer's policy but nonetheless
entitled to enforce it.164 Without explicitly saying so, the court once
again seemed to be relying on the doctrine of promissory estoppel to
justify its holding. Under promissory estoppel, it is necessary to find at
least one promise of which the employee was aware and upon which he
relied in order to find an implied contract. Apparently the Michigan
Supreme Court found such a promise in the image of fair treatment
which the totality of the employer's policies was designed to create. In
the court's view, the employer's decision to seek the good will of his
workforce gave rise to his implied promise that the employee would be
treated in accordance with the image that the employer had projected.
According to Toussaint, the employer has no obligation to create any
policies for the employee's benefit. But where he has done so and the
policies are in force, justice would demand that the employer be held
accountable for his promises to the employee regardless of whether the
employee is unaware of any specific policy relating to fair treatment.
This interpretation stretches the principle of promissory estoppel be-
yond its usual measure by implying constructive reliance on a particu-
163. Id. § 90. See also note 43 supra.
164. This is an alternative holding, however, because Toussaint himself became aware of Blue
Cross' discharge policies in the personnel manual moments after his hiring. 408 Mich. at 597, 292
N.W.2d at 884.
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lar policy because there has been some reliance on a more general
policy. In a case where the employee is unaware of the specific policy,
presumably there would have to be proof that the employee had relied
upon the general policy as a predicate to allowing him to enforce the
specific policy.
Promissory estoppel analysis also would accommodate the Tous-
saint court's holding that the enforceability of the employer's statement
of policy is unaffected by the employer's right to unilateraly alter the
policy. If the employer changes the policy and the employee continues
to work, the employee is entitled to enforce the new policy in order to
avoid injustice where there is either actual or constructive knowledge of
and reliance on a new policy. Similarly the employee could not assert a
right to the former policy since there can be no reliance upon a nonex-
istent policy.
Critique of the Dissenting Opinion
The dissent attacks the majority decision on four fronts: there was
no bargaining by Toussaint for the assurance that he would be dis-
missed only for cause; there was neither direct nor circumstantial evi-
dence from which a jury could have concluded that Blue Cross'
discharge policy was integrated into Toussaint's employment contract;
there cannot be reliance upon a policy unless an employee is ac-
quainted with that policy; and there is no basis for an employer to an-
ticipate that an employee would rely upon the employer's promise of
job security. Each criticism is without persuasive force.
First, the dissent takes a narrow and unwarranted view of "bar-
gaining." According to the dissent, Ebling could enforce his employer's
promises to evaluate his job performance and to discharge him only for
cause because those promises were concessions resulting fom a period
of negotiations. 65 Toussaint, on the other hand, merely inquired about
job security on the day of the hiring. In response to that inquiry, he
was told that he would not be fired absent good cause. Therefore, be-
cause Toussaint was passive in that he did not haggle over assurances
of job security, the dissent concluded that he was entitled to none.
Followed to its extreme conclusion, the dissent implies that a pro-
spective employee who merely asks what salary he will be paid would
not necessarily be entitled to the quoted rate because the specified sal-
ary would be an "unbargained" for term. Bargaining, however, de-
scribes a broad process, where a number of terms and conditions might
165. Id. at 641 n.4, 292 N.W.2d at 904 n.4.
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be considered.166 Each term need not be haggled over. The bargaining
in Toussaint's case presumably involved discussion of certain specific
duties of the job. Among the quidpro quo for Toussant's acceptance of
the job offer was Blue Cross' promise of benefits including discharge
only for cause.
Second, the dissent disagreed with the majority that a jury could
have found that the manual's provisions were incorporated into Tous-
saint's contract. Contrary to the dissent's belief, however, there was
enough evidence upon which a jury could have ruled as the majority
claimed. Toussaint testified that he believed that he had an employ-
ment contract, although he could not offer a signed document. 167 He
further believed that the contract included provisions from the manual.
A literal reading of the manual, despite its caption "Supervisory Man-
ual," was that its terms applied to all nonprobationary employees, "in
all Blue Cross areas, divisions and departments."'' 68 Blue Cross, how-
ever, insisted that the manual did not apply to supervisors but that it
was intended to guide their management of employees; it was undis-
puted that Toussaint did not supervise any employee. In sum, it seems
clear that there was enough evidence upon which a jury could have
decided that the manual's terms were incorporated into Toussaint's em-
ployment contract.
Third, the dissent disagreed with the majority's assertion that an
employee cannot rely upon his employer's policy if he did not learn of
it until after the hiring. The dissent's criticism here is faulty because an
employee would not have to show that he was aware of the specific
policy in question at the time of the hiring for it to be actionable.
Where the employee merely wants to show that the specific policy be-
came a term of the employment contract at some point, he need only
prove that he learned of the policy sometime between when he was
hired and when he was fired. Consequently, so long as Toussaint
learned of the policy sometime after the hiring but before he was fired,
his employment contract would be modified to incorporate all subse-
quent terms, including the right to be discharged only for cause.
Finally, the dissent's belief that an employer justifiably may expect
that a promise of deferred compensation would induce reliance by the
employee, but that a promise of job security would not, is indefensible.
166. Seegeneral, R. SMITH, ET. AL., COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND ARBITRATION: MATERI-
ALS ON THE NEGOTIATION, ENFORCEMENT AND CONTENT OF LABOR AGREEMENTS, Part I ch. 3
(1970).
167. 408 Mich. at 597 n.5, 641, 292 N.W.2d at 884 n.5, 905.
168. Id. at 651, 292 N.W.2d at 909.
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This view can be challenged by considering the similarities between a
promise of severance pay and a promise to discharge for cause only.
Severance pay purportedly is offered for the purpose of improving the
employer-employee relationship. 69 Not only does the employer seek
better relations with current employees through a policy of severance
pay, but the employer also seeks to improve its image in the commu-
nity. This, in turn, may ensure that competent workers will be attracted
in the future. In Toussaint, there was no evidence that Blue Cross had
set out fair discharge procedures for any reason but to secure a cooper-
ative workforce. Thus, it is fair to conclude that Blue Cross' reputation
as a just employer would enhance its image in the community and aid
in the employment of personnel in the future.
A promise of severance pay also may protect an employee from
arbitrary discharge. 170 If a company must grant severance pay, fiscal
respohsibility dictates that discharge decisions must be carefully evalu-
ated so as to avoid making unwarranted dismissals. Similarly, if an
employer promises to discharge only for cause, an employee might rea-
sonably believe that his employer is unlikely to discharge without cause
rather than to risk being sued for breach of contract.
Moreover, the right to be discharged only for cause as promised is
analogous to a deferred benefit, the right to which is earned after a
period of service. Where the employee has completed a task acording
to his employer's standards, he has earned the right not to be dis-
charged. But where the employee has performed poorly, he has not
accrued protection from discharge. He has given the employer good
cause for his dismissal.
Impact of Toussaint: A Gain or a Loss for Employees?
A possible consequence of Toussaint, raised by the defendants and
amici,17 1 is that it will cause the courts to be flooded with claims of
unjust discharge. In response to this fear, the Michigan Supreme Court
suggested that the contesting parties might agree prospectively to an
alternative method of dispute resolution such as binding arbitration.
The court's recommendation for arbitration is consistent with a com-
mon provision in collective bargaining agreements between employers
and unions. 172 The recommendation also is consistent with a national
policy to alleviate congestion of court calendars and to encourage
169. See, e.g., Cain v. Allen Elec. & Equip. Co., 346 Mich. 568, 78 N.W.2d 296 (1956).
170. Id.
171. Chrysler Corporation filed briefs in Toussaint as amicus curiae.
172. See note 4 supra.
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speedy problem solving through the increased use of arbitration. 173 In
any event, fear of flooding the courts with litigation is unwarranted. A
court should not shrink from making a proper decision because the
effect of that decision might be to encourage litigants to vindicate their
rights. 1
74
The amici also warned that if discharge for good cause were re-
quired, productivity and competency of the workforce would suffer. ' 75
Apparently, the amici were suggesting that if an employer would not be
able to discharge an employee except for cause, the employer would
legally be unable to dismiss an employee because of shoddy work. The
Toussaint court, however, did not make discharge for cause a
mandatory requirement of indefinite term employment contracts.
Moreover, good cause for discharge does not imply lower performance
standards. The Michigan Supreme Court explained that where an em-
ployer articulates standards of performance, those standards compose
his policy. Like a promise to discharge with cause, expressed perform-
ance standards are integrated into an employee's contract 76 and he
may be held to those standards.
Where a discharge is founded on an employee's failure to meet an
employer's expressed and consistently applied standards and rules, the
discharge is for cause. Another effect of Toussaint, therefore, might be
to encourage employers to establish and announce minimum required
standards of production as well as work and safety rules. Only where
there are no clearly articulated rules or where enforcement is selective
will a jury be asked to determine whether the employee's behavior
amounted to good cause for the discharge.
77
Since many medium to large sized companies distribute personnel
manuals, the potential number of indefinite term employees protected
by Toussaint is large. The Michigan Supreme Court held that even
where a worker fails to bargain for assurances of job security, but his
employer has instituted a policy of discharge for cause, that policy is
enforceable. Additionally, all Michigan employees-at will or other-
wise-may benefit from Toussaint. Presumably, Toussaint provides
173. Dispute Resolution Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-190, §§ 1-10, 94 Stat. 17 (1980). The Act
reflects a congressional finding that for many, appropriate dispute mechanisms "are largely un-
available, inaccessible, ineffective, expensive or unfair." Note, Dispute Resolution Act Passed, 35
ARB. J. 18,19 (June 1980). The principal purpose of the Act is to make grants available through
state and local government and non-profit groups to establish new or design improved mecha-
nisms for the resolution of minor disputes.
174. See note 74 supra.
175. 408 Mich. at 623, 292 N.w.2d at 896.
176. Id. at 624, 292 N.W.2d at 897.
177. Id.
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that employees are entitled to benefit from any of their employer's poli-
cies which are in force. Policy statements which could be enforceable
might be the kind which are posted on the company bulletin boards,
announced at office meetings or published in a personnel manual. Be-
cause of such policy statements, an employee might be justified in de-
manding that his employer's announcement of an extra day's vacation
at Christmas or his promise of a progressive disciplinary policy be
strictly enforced. 1
78
Despite its promise of job protection and other rights derived from
company policy, the final effect of Toussaint may be that indefinite
term employees in Michigan will remain at the risk of arbitrary dis-
charge. It is important to note that the Michigan Supreme Court did
not abrogate an employer's right to make a contract expressly termina-
ble at will. After Toussaint, an employer can establish a policy of re-
quiring prospective employees to acknowledge that they serve at the
will or at the pleasure of the company. 179 Prior to Toussaint, it was
unlikely that many employers would have executed such a contract,
because they believed that the terminable at will rule already gave
them broad discharge powers. Now a Michigan employer who wishes
to retain unfettered discretion over termination decisions may well
make such an agreement.
Accordingly, Toussaint may give rise to the widespread use of dis-
claimers of discharge for cause.' 80 An example of an employer's suc-
178. One amicus curiae argued that:
[L]arge organizations regularly distribute memoranda, bulletins and manuals reflecting
established conditions and periodic changes in policy. These documents are drafted "for
clarity and accuracy and to properly advise those subject to the policy memo of its Con-
tents." If such memoranda are held by this Court to form part of the employment con-
tract, large employers will be severely hampered by the resultant inability to issue policy
statements.
Id. at 619, 292 N.W.2d at 894. In response, the Michigan Supreme Court said that "[an employer
who establishes no personnel policies instills no reasonable expectations of performance." Id.
179. Id. at 596 n.5, 614 n.27, 640-41, 292 N.W.2d at 884 n.5, 892 n.27, 904-06.
180. It is unlikely that a written disclaimer of job security would be stricken from an employ-
ment contract as an unconscionable term. A term is unconscionable if, for example, it appears in
small print, is in a document wherein rights and duties would not be expected to be set forth or
where there is a vast inequality of bargaining power between the parties. See, e.g., Williams v.
Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978); 1 CORBIN
ON CONTRACTS § 128 (1963). An example of an atypical format case is Weisz v. Parke-Bennet
Galleries, Inc., 67 Misc. 2d 1077, 325 N.Y.S.2d 576 (1971) (catalog of paintings to be auctioned
was an inappropriate form in which to disclaim auctioneer's liability of authenticity). An employ-
ment contract, however, is expected to recite the rights and duties of the parties. Although an
employee generally is in a bargaining position inferior to an employer, most prospective employ-
ees have a choice of some other employment. In Henningen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J.
358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), a waiver of liability of injury was held to be an unconscionable term in a
contract for purchase of a new automobile, in part because such a term was standard in the auto-
mobile industry, leaving the consumer no choice but to waive liability. If all employers, or per-
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cessful use of a disclaimer to avoid liability for discharge is found in
No vosel v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 181 In No vosel, decided in reliance on
Toussaint, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan validated a disclaimer of job security that for many years had
been included on the employer's job application form. 8 2 The Novosel
opinion is silent regarding why the employee believed that he could be
dismissed only for cause. The court said, however, that thesigned dis-
claimer destroyed the possibility that the employee could have relied
on any policy that provided that there would be no discharge except for
cause.
Certainly other employers who do not wish to provide for dis-
charge only for cause might seek a similar disclaimer and at the same
time make no statements which could lead to inadvertent, but enforcea-
ble rights in indefinite term employees. If large numbers of employees
refused to sign a disclaimer as a condition of employment, the em-
ployer might have to delete the disclaimer from the application form.
The employer, however, would not have to make any affirmative
promises of job protection.
The decision in Toussaint encourages employers to insulate them-
selves from litigation by requiring that a prospective employee disclaim
the right to be discharged except for cause. The Toussaint court, how-
ever, did not indicate how it would rule in light of contradictory evi-
dence of the parties intentions such as where both a disclaimer and a
plantwide policy to discharge only for cause existed. The Novosel deci-
sion is not instructive because in that case the source of the employee's
belief that he was entitled to be discharged only for cause was not in-
dentified.
If a policy of discharge for cause were promulgated subsequent to
the execution of the disclaimer, a court might find that the original con-
tract was modified and that the employee was protected by the new
policy. 183 The more difficult question arises when an employee signs a
haps all those in one industry, required that all prospective employees disclaim job protection,
then such a disclaimer might be stricken from the contract as an unconscionable term.
181. No. 79-73926 (E.D. Mich. Sept. 5, 1980) (applying Michigan law).
182. The application form, in pertinent part, provided that:
In consideration of my employment, I agree to conform to the rules of Sears, Roebuck
and Co., and my employment and compensation can be terminated, with or without
cause, and without notice, at any time, at the option of either the Company or myself. I
understand that no store manager or representative of Sears, Roebuck and Co., other
than the president or vice president . . . has authority to enter into any agreement for
employment for any specified period of time, or to make any agreement contrary to the
foregoing.
Id. at 5.
183. See, e.g., Carter v. Kaskaskia Comm. Action Agency, 24 I11. App. 3d 1056, 322 N.E.2d
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disclaimer of job protection where his employer has a contemporane-
ous policy to discharge only for cause. This situation may arise be-
cause few employers would take the chance of deleting existing and
advertised discharge procedures when to do so might cause a serious
threat to employee morale or a loss of personnel. To resolve the con-
tradiction of whether the disclaimer is superior or subordinate to the
discharge policy, a court might consider whether the employee knew of
the policy but signed the disclaimer in spite of it. A court might well
conclude that such a disclaimer evidenced the parties' true intentions
not to be bound. This would comply with the presumption that an
indefinite term employment contract is at will unless there is evidence
to the contrary. 84 A court also might consider whether the employee
really understood the implication of the disclaimer or if the employee
believed that the disclaimer was a mere formality, which in practice
was not enforced. An analysis of whether the disclaimer was an uncon-
scionable term also might be appropriate.
8 5
Where an employee claims that if he had known that a policy to
discharge only for cause was in force he would not have signed the
disclaimer, some court, influenced by the spirit of Toussaint, might
struggle to find a basis upon which to void the disclaimer. In light of
the Michigan Supreme Court's disapproval of employers who promul-
gate policies to garner employee good will and then avoid the policies'
provisions, a refusal to enforce a disclaimer might be jusified in light of
a contemporaneous policy to discharge only for cause.
Accordingly, any expansion of the discharge protection afforded to
indefinite term employees by Toussaint is speculative. If employers are
prompted to make explicit that an employee serves at the pleasure of
the company or otherwise fail to proffer statements of job security pol-
574 (1974). In Carter, an employer discussed proposed policies, including discharge standards,
with a committee of employees before the terms were integrated into a new employment manual.
The Carter court held that the published manual constituted a modification of the employee's
indefinite term employment contract and that the employee could not be fired in violation of the
discharge policy published therein; accord, Gishen v. Dura Corp., 362 Mass. 177, 285 N.E.2d 117
(1972); Williams v. Action for Better Comm., Inc., 51 App. Div. 2d 876, 380 N.Y.S.2d 138, leave to
appeal denied, 39 N.Y.2d 708, 351 N.E.2d 439 (1977). &ut see Sargent v. lIT, 78 111. App. 3d 117,
397 N.E.2d 443 (1979), where an employee was denied recovery for dismissal contrary to the
procedure set forth in the personnel manual. The Sargent court distinguished Sargent from
Carter because in the Carter case the manual was in force when the employee was hired whereas
in Sargent the manual was drafted subsequent to the hiring. See also Johnson v. National Beef
Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976); Cederstrand v. Lutheran Bhd., 263 Minn. 520, 117
N.W.2d 213 (1962) (cases which hold that the terms in an employment manual are not enforceable
because they are not bargained for).
184. See notes 133-35 supra and accompanying text.
185. See note 180 supra.
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icy, an employee will have no grounds upon which to persuade an arbi-
trator or a court that he was hired or worked with the understanding
that he would not be discharged except for good cause. The common
law presumption, that an employee of indefinite term is terminable at
will, would prevail.
Conclusion
In Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, the Michigan
Supreme Court held that, where an employer induces a reasonable ex-
pectation in an employee that he will not be discharged except for
cause, the employee may not be discharged arbitrarily. The court fur-
ther held that it is irrelevant whether the reasonable expectation is the
result of an employer's express written or oral promise or of some state-
ment of policy in a personnel manual. The decision may be a mixed
blessing for at will workers seeking job protection from arbitrary dis-
charge. On one hand, a significant number of Michigan workers, espe-
cially those who work for companies which include discharge rights
and procedures in a personnel manual, will enjoy increased job protec-
tion. On the other hand, as a result of Toussaint, employers may be
encouraged to eliminate statements of policy that might give rise to
discharge rights and require that prospective employees disclaim such
rights. The Toussaint court held that where there are no policies, there
can be no reasonable reliance. The long term effect of Toussaint, there-
fore, may be to diminish rather than to enhance the protection from
arbitrary discharge that might be afforded to indefinite term employees.
Perhaps the only meaningful protection for employees will result
from national legislation. Although many commentators believe that
enactment of a law prohibiting the discharge of an employee without
good cause is improbable, their pessimism may be unwarranted. Of
course, neither employer associations nor unions would have an incen-
tive to support such legislation. But, it is possible that a majority of
indefinite term workers could capture congressional attention. It may
be that to win job protection at will workers will have to organize and
collectively assert their will.
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